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Abstract: Many relevant logics are conservatively extended
by Boolean negation. Not all, however. This paper shows an
acute form of non-conservativeness, namely that the Boolean
free fragment of the Boolean extension of a relevant logic
need not always satisfy the variable sharing property. In
fact, it is shown that such an extension can in fact yield clas-
sical logic. For a vast range of relevant logic, however, it
is shown that the variable sharing property, restricted to the
Boolean-free fragment, still holds for the Boolean extended
logic.
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1. Introduction
One of the hallmarks of relevant logics is the variable sharing property,
that if A → B is a logical theorem, then A and B share a propositional
variable. The reason the property is treasured is that it is thought to satisfy
the requirement that for an entailment statement to be true, the statement
need to have related relata; related by some kind of relevance. One way
of making this more precise is to demand that there needs to be some kind
of commonality of meaning between the antecedent and consequent of a
true entailment statement. After noting that in the propositional case “com-
monality of meaning is carried by identity of propositional variables” ([2,
p. 144]), Belnap then suggested the variable sharing property as a way to
cash out the relevance criterion and showed that the logic E satisfies the
property.
One of the objections to both classical and modal logics and a motivat-
ing factor for investigating relevance as a logical concept in the first place,
was that these logics validate the implicational paradoxes expressed by
A ∧ ¬A B and A B ∨ ¬B, where is either the material conditional
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⊃, or the strict conditional J.1 These two axioms express that negation
is Boolean over the relation expressed by the implication conditional. The
standard relevant negation has therefore ever since been the weaker De Mor-
gan negation ∼. However, Robert Meyer and Richard Routley started in the
early seventies to investigate so-called classical relevant logics—relevant
logics with a Boolean negation added as an additional primitive negation.
The addition is got by simply adding the two Boolean axioms
(B1) A ∧ ¬A→ B Boolean explosion axiom
(B2) A→ B ∨ ¬B Boolean excl. middle axiom,
where → is the relevant conditional. Of course, the variable sharing prop-
erty does not hold unrestrictedly for such logics, but the addition was in
many cases found to be conservative, and so it follows that at least the
Boolean-free fragment of these logics still satisfies it. In fact, even for those
logics, logics such as E and NR, for which the extension turned out to be
non-conservative, it is often quite trivial to show that the Boolean extension
is not so non-conservative as to rob the Boolean free fragment of its vari-
able sharing property. But then again, not always. The purpose of this short
paper is simply to show that the Boolean-free-fragment-restricted variable
sharing property holds for a vast range of Boolean extended logics, but that
this is not always the case. As we shall see, there are cases where L is a rel-
evant logic, but where the Boolean extension of L is in fact classical logic.
The example which is presented in this paper is T3—T augmented by the
RM3-distinctive axiom A ∨ (A→ B).
The plan for the paper is as follows: Sect. 2 provides the axioms and rules
of some common relevant logics and some extensions thereof before Sect. 3
shows forth Belnap’s proof of the variable sharing property and Méndez et
al.’s variant of it. Sect. 4 shows the main result that this property is not
always passed on to the Boolean extension of a relevant logic. Sect. 5 then
summarizes.
This is the second of in all three essays on Boolean negation and non-
conservativeness pertaining to relevant logics. The first essay, [11], dealt
with modal relevant logics, whereas the third essay, [12], deals with the
question whether relevant logics with the truth-constant known as the Ack-
ermann constant can be conservatively extended by Boolean negation. To-
gether the three essays paint a picture of relevant logics being quite of-
ten non-conservatively extended by Boolean negation. It should therefore
be noted that many relevant logics in fact are conservatively extended by
Boolean negation. Neither of the three papers make any effort to survey
such proofs, however. The interested reader should consult [4], [5], [9] and
[13].
BOOLEAN NEGATION AND NON-CONSERVATIVITY II 3
T A1–A10, A12–A13, R1–R2 E T +A14, +A15
R T (or E) +A11 LM L +A16
L3 L +A17 CL L +B1–B2
Table 1. Definitions of T, E and R and some extensions thereof.
2. Definition of logics
(A1) A→ A identity
(A2) A→ A ∨ B and B→ A ∨ B ∨-introduction
(A3) A ∧ B→ A and A ∧ B→ B ∧-elimination
(A4) ∼∼A→ A double negation elimination
(A5) A ∧ (B ∨C)→ (A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧C) distribution
(A6) (A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)→ (A→ B ∧C) strong lattice ∧
(A7) (A→ C) ∧ (B→ C)→ (A ∨ B→ C) strong lattice ∨
(A8) (A→ ∼B)→ (B→ ∼A) contraposition axiom
(A9) (A→ B)→ ((B→ C)→ (A→ C)) suffixing axiom
(A10) (A→ B)→ ((C → A)→ (C → B)) prefixing axiom
(A11) A→ ((A→ B)→ B) assertion axiom
(A12) (A→ ∼A)→ ∼A reductio
(A13) (A→ (A→ B))→ (A→ B) contraction axiom
(A14) ((A→ A)→ B)→ B 1. E-distinctive axiom
(A15) 2A ∧2B→ 2(A ∧ B) 2. E-distinctive axiom
(2C =d f (C → C)→ C)
(A16) A→ (A→ A) Mingle
(A17) A ∨ (A→ B) RM3-distinctive axiom
(B1) A ∧ ¬A→ B Boolean explosion axiom
(B2) A→ B ∨ ¬B Boolean excl. middle axiom
(R1) A, B ` A ∧ B adjunction
(R2) A, A→ B ` B modus ponens
3. The variable sharing property for modal and non-modal relevant
logics
Belnap proved the variable sharing property to hold of E by showing
forth the eight-element algebra displayed in Fig. 1.2 The set T is the set
of designated elements; conjunction and disjunction are interpreted as in-
fimum and supremum, and →, ∼, and 2 are interpreted according to the
1Intuitionistic logic is similarly charged of validating implicational paradoxes. Although
A→ B ∨ ¬B does not hold in intuitionistic logic, A ∧ ¬A→ B does.
2All models depicted in this paper have been found with the help of MaGIC—an acronym
for Matrix Generator for Implication Connectives—which is an open source computer pro-
gram created by John K. Slaney ([14]). I have made heavy use of both it as well as William
McCune’s theorem prover/model generator package Prover9/Mace4 ([7]) in arriving at the
results reported in this essay.
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displayed matrices. The following theorem and proof thereof is that given
by Belnap in [2]:
Theorem 1 (Belnap’s vsp-theorem). E has the variable sharing property.
Proof. Assume that A and B share no propositional variable. Assign to
every propositional variable in A the value +1, and +2 to every variable in
B. It is easy to check that both {−1,+1} and {−2,+2} are closed under the
functions which interprets ∼,2,∧,∨,→, and so A will be assigned either
−1 or +1 and B either −2 or +2. It is then easy to check that A→ B will be
assigned −3. Since the model is a model for all the axioms and rules of E
(left for the reader), it follows that A → B is not a theorem. Thus if A → B

















→ −3 −2 −1 −0 +0 +1 +2 +3
−3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3
−2 −3 +2 −3 +2 −3 −3 +2 +3
−1 −3 −3 +1 +1 −3 +1 −3 +3
−0 −3 −3 −3 +0 −3 −3 −3 +3
+0 −3 −2 −1 −0 +0 +1 +2 +3
+1 −3 −3 −1 −1 −3 +1 −3 +3
+2 −3 −2 −3 −2 −3 −3 +2 +3
+3 −3 −3 −3 −3 −3 −3 −3 +3
∼ +3 +2 +1 +0 −0 −1 −2 −3
2 −3 −2 −1 −0 +0 +1 +2 +3
Figure 1. Belnap’s model of relevance
E’s 2 is a defined operator—2A =d f (A → A) → A—which expresses
a S4 modality. The stronger logic R, however, is not a modal logic in any
meaningful sense. It was later noted that Belnap’s model is also a model
of the stronger logic R, and since 2 is interpreted as the identity operator
in the model, it also validate Meyer’s NR as well as stronger modal logics
such as R52 got by adding the following modal axioms and rule, where now
2 is taken as primitive, to R:3
(NEC) ∅ ` A⇒ ∅ ` 2A
(K) 2(A→ B)→ (2A→ 2B)
(2/∧) 2A ∧2B→ 2(A ∧ B)




3NR is simply R5 without the 5- and 2/∨-axioms.
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This, then, shows that a large class of logics satisfies the variable sharing
property. Early on it was thought that also RM—R augmented by the min-
gle axiom A → (A → A)—would also turn out to satisfy the variable shar-
ing property; Meyer then reported that “[s]urprisingly, R-mingle doesn’t—
Dunn and I found the counterexample CNCppCqq” ([8]).4 However, RM
and its three-valued extension RM3 was found to satisfy the weaker prop-
erty that if A → B is a logical theorem, then either A and B share a propo-
sitional variable, or both ∼A and B are theorems. Anderson and Belnap
thought this to be an insufficient property for ensuring relevance and so
claimed that “relevance and mingle are incompatible” ([1, p. 98]). Whereas
it is true that neither RM nor EM satisfies the variable sharing property,
Méndez et al. showed in [10] that TM does satisfies the variable sharing
property.5
The proof of Méndez et al. is basically like Belnap’s but uses a different
six-element algebraic structure—displayed in Fig. 2—instead of Belnap’s
eight-element structure. Méndez et al. do not consider modal extensions of
TM, but by simply interpreting 2 as the identity operator, and let 3 =d f
∼2∼, their model can easily be checked be a model for TM52 as well.
They do note that their model not only validates TM, but also the E-axiom
((A → A) → B) → B (A14). As can easily be checked, their model in fact
also validates the RM3-distinctive axiom A∨ (A→ B). It follows, then, that
TM523 [A14] has the variable sharing property.












→ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 5 5 5 5 5 5
1 0 4 4 4 4 4
2 0 0 2 0 4 5
3 0 0 0 3 4 5
4 0 0 0 0 4 5
5 0 0 0 0 0 5
∼ 5 4 2 3 1 0
Figure 2. Méndez et al.’s 6-element model for variable sharing
4. The variable sharing property for classical relevant logics
Robert Meyer and Richard Routley showed in [9] that CR—R extended
by the Boolean axioms B1 and B2—is a conservative extension. Thus since
R has the variable sharing property, so does CR, provided, of course, that
4CNCppCqq is Polish for ∼(p→ p)→ (q→ q).
5EM is sometimes taken to be the logic E augmented by (A → B) → ((A → B) → (A →
B)). It is still an open question whether E extended by this →-restricted mingle axiom
satisfies the variable sharing property or not.
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one restricts to the ¬-free fragment. Since not all relevant logics are conser-
vatively extended by Boolean negation—E being a noteworthy example6—
an easier proof of this ¬-free restricted variable sharing property would be
preferable. A moments notice suffices for realizing that Belnap’s model can
simply be augmented with the following matrix for ¬:
−3 −2 −1 −0 +0 +1 +2 +3
¬ +3 +1 +2 +0 −0 −2 −1 −3
We therefore get the following corollary:
Corollary 1. All sublogics of CR52 have the ¬-restricted variable sharing
property.
TM is not a sublogic of CR52 and it is easy to see that Méndez et al.’s
model can’t be extended to a model for ¬ so as to validate the two Boolean
axioms.7 There is, however, a different model, quite similar to Belnap’s,
which can be used to show the same result as for CR52:
Theorem 2. CTM52[A14] has the ¬-restricted variable sharing property.
Proof. The model in Fig. 3 is a model for CTM52[A14]. Inspecting the
model it is evident that {−1,+1} and {−2,+2} are also in this case closed
under all connectives except ¬, and so the result follows by the same type

















→ −3 −2 −1 −0 +0 +1 +2 +3
−3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3
−2 −3 +2 −3 +3 −3 −3 +2 +3
−1 −3 −3 +1 +3 −3 +1 −3 +3
−0 −3 −3 −3 +3 −3 −3 −3 +3
+0 −0 −0 −0 −0 +3 +3 +3 +3
+1 −3 −3 −1 −0 −3 +1 −3 +3
+2 −3 −2 −3 −0 −3 −3 +2 +3
+3 −3 −3 −3 −0 −3 −3 −3 +3
∼ +3 +2 +1 +0 −0 −1 −2 −3
¬ +3 +1 +2 +0 −0 −2 −1 −3
2 −3 −2 −1 −0 +0 +1 +2 +3
Figure 3. A 8-element model for CTM52[A14]
Note that the RM3-distinctive axiom A ∨ (A → B) (A17) is not a theo-
rem of CTM52[A14]. As the proof of following theorem show, that axiom
together with the Boolean axioms is too potent a mix:
6Mares proved this in [6]. See [11] for an easy proof which applies to a range of logics.
7If the first axiom A ∧ ¬A → B is to be satisfied, one needs to set ¬x = 0 for all non-zero
elements in the algebra. But then J5 → 1 ∨ ¬1K = 0, and so the second Boolean axiom,
A→ B ∨ ¬B, will not be satisfied.
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Theorem 3. There are logics L which have the variable sharing property
but are such that CL do not have the ¬-restricted variable sharing property.
Proof. We saw earlier that even TM3[A14] has the variable sharing prop-
erty. However, CT3 does not have the ¬-restricted variable sharing property
as the following derivation of the weakening rule A ` B→ A shows:8
(1) A assumption
(2) ¬A ∨ (¬A→ A) A17
(3) A ∧ (¬A ∨ (¬A→ A) 1, 2, R1
(4) (A ∧ ¬A) ∨ (A ∧ (¬A→ A)) 3, A5
(5) A ∧ ¬A→ (¬A→ A) B1
(6) A ∧ (¬A→ A)→ (¬A→ A) A3
(7) (A ∧ ¬A) ∨ (A ∧ (¬A→ A))→ (¬A→ A) 6, A7
(8) ¬A→ A 4, 7, R2
(9) A ∨ ¬A→ A 8, fiddling
(10) B→ A ∨ ¬A B2
(11) B→ A 9, 10, transitivity of→

Thus even though T3 is a relevant logic, CT3 is arguably not seeing as it
does not have the ¬-restricted variable sharing property.9 That this is so is
underscored by the following corollary:
Corollary 2. There are relevant logics L for which the Boolean extension
is identical to classical logic.
Proof. The proof is to the effect that weakening axiom, A → (B → A), is a
theorem of CT3. The meta-rule of reasoning by cases, A ` C B ` CA ∨ B ` C
, is provable for any axiomatic extension of T.10 Since A17 is an axiom,
we get as one of its instance A ∨ (A → (B → A)). Using Thm. 3 twice we
get that A ` A → (B → A). And since A → (B → A) ` A → (B → A),
reasoning by cases yields that ` A→ (B→ A). Since even T augmented by
the weakening axiom is identical to classical logic, it follows that also CT3
is. 
8Note that one does not need the full power of CT3 for the proof to go through; besides
the Boolean and RM3-distinctive axiom it only requires a minimum of logical resources;
the weak relevant logic BB—got by dropping axioms A12 and A13 from T and weakening
axioms A6–A10 to rule form—would suffice. The weakening rule destroys any hope of
satisfying the variable sharing property for all logics with logical theorems—and therefore
also for BB—since if ∅ ` A, the weakening rule yields ∅ ` B→ A for every B.
9That T3 has the variable sharing property follows also from the fact that it is a sublogic
of the logic of the Chrystal lattice axiomatized by adding both the RM3-distinctive axiom
as well as the axiom ∼A ∧ B → (∼A → A) ∨ (A → B) to R. See [3, §§9.7–9.8] for this
axiomatization and proof of the variable sharing property.
10See [11, thm. 2] for a proof.
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5. Summary
This paper shows an acute form of non-conservativeness, namely that the
Boolean free fragment of the Boolean extension of a relevant logic need
not always satisfy the variable sharing property. We saw that this was the
case with the logic T3—T augmented by the RM3-distinctive axiom A ∨
(A → B)—which itself satisfies the variable sharing property, but that the
weakening rule A ` B → A is a derivable rule of its Boolean extension.
This, then, was shown to be sufficient for deriving all of classical logic.
For a vast range of Boolean extended relevant logics, however—even S5-
modal extensions of both TM[A14] and R—the variable sharing property,
restricted to the Boolean-free fragment, was shown to hold.
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